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Abstract 
Failure of projects and firms are an inherent element of growth. Economic growth 
requires that old activities are phased out to make room for new ones, and that 
economic resources are reallocated from activities that are no longer profitable. In an 
economy where most firms are financed by debt to a substantial extent, insolvencies 
inevitably play an important role in restructuring. Insolvency leads to formal 
bankruptcy when legal procedures are employed to liquidate the insolvent firm’s 
assets in order to pay stakeholders fully or partially according to a priority established 
in law or contracts. In some countries legal procedures exist for restructuring as well 
as for liquidation. In other countries the restructuring of an insolvent firm is handled 
informally through negotiation.  
The economic roles of insolvency procedures are discussed (in Section 2) with an 
emphasis on dynamic aspects. In discussing the efficiency of insolvency procedures 
(in Section 3) we distinguish between ex ante and ex post efficiency. Since efficiency 
ultimately must be evaluated in terms of its dynamic effects, simple efficiency criteria 
are not easily identified. Formal insolvency procedures in different countries are 
classified (in Section 4) as more or less creditor or debtor oriented. Legal approaches 
can also be classified as more or less contractual or statutory. The important 
interdependence between formal and informal procedures is discussed in Section 
5.Thereafter we turn in Section 6 to the empirical evidence on bankruptcy and 
restructuring in a number of countries with substantial differences in legal approaches 
to insolvency. We ask in Section 7 what explains the relatively high bankruptcy 
frequency in Sweden in an international comparison. Is the high frequency an 
indication of efficiency of procedures or does it indicate that viable firms are forced 
into bankruptcy unnecessarily?  
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  11. Introduction 
Economic growth requires that old activities are phased out to make room 
for new ones, and that economic resources are reallocated from activities 
that are no longer profitable. Failure of projects and firms must therefore 
be seen as an inherent element of a growth process This reallocation can 
occur within a conglomerate, or one firm may disinvest while another one 
invests in new projects. Insolvency of a firm, in the sense that its 
stakeholders’ claims cannot be fully satisfied, occur if management does 
not shut down or reduce activities in time, or if large and sudden shocks 
occur. In an economy where most firms are to a substantial extent 
financed by debt, insolvencies inevitably play an important role in the 
restructuring process. In our terminology insolvency leads to formal 
bankruptcy when legal procedures are employed to liquidate the insolvent 
firm’s assets in order to pay stakeholders fully or partially according to a 
priority established in law or contracts.
1 In some countries legal 
procedures exist for restructuring (rehabilitation), as well as for 
liquidation. In other countries the restructuring of an insolvent firm is 
handled informally through negotiation. Formal and informal procedures 
may also be combined in such a way that the formal bankruptcy is made 
part of an informally negotiated resolution of a firm’s distress. 
              The “infrastructure for bankruptcy” discussed in this paper 
includes institutions and organizations involved in the formal and 
informal procedures for dealing with insolvent firms or firms in distress. 
At the center of the discussion stands insolvency law for firms and the 
court systems supporting the law, but the bankruptcy infrastructure is 
much broader. Informal procedures for insolvency are as important as 
formal law and they necessarily involve banks as the major creditors. 
                                                 
1 This terminology is common but not general. Sometimes bankruptcy law is used as a term for 
insolvency law including restructuring law. 
  2Therefore, law and regulation for financial institutions may be considered 
an aspect of the infrastructure for bankruptcy.  
            In this paper we address the issue of efficiency of the bankruptcy 
process focusing on bankruptcy and restructuring law. These laws can be 
considered one aspect of the “financial architecture” of a country. Since 
financial systems vary considerably across countries it is possible that the 
efficient bankruptcy law varies across countries as well.   
       From banks’ point of view insolvency procedures are one aspect of 
debt recovery. The procedures for debt recovery include the enforcement 
of loan contracts through the takeover or sale of assets that have been 
pledged as security for the loans. Such enforcement requires property 
registration and effective transfer of property rights. 
       Other stakeholders than banks are also affected by a firm’s 
insolvency. Employees, customers, suppliers, the state, and of course 
shareholders may have a stake and some kind of claim on a firm’s assets. 
Thus the variety of laws regulating contractual relations among 
stakeholders interact with insolvency procedures.  
      Although bankruptcy is not a criminal offense, and debtors’ prisons 
have been abandoned in most countries, criminal law relating to civil 
fraud and corruption has a bearing on insolvency procedures. Finally, 
personal bankruptcy procedures may affect insolvency procedures for 
firms even under limited liability, because an owners’ personal 
guarantees may be required by creditors.  
             While lawyers in their discussion of insolvency law often focus 
on fairness and equity, economists are concerned with economic 
efficiency, growth, and business cycle fluctuations. Insolvencies happen 
everywhere but practices vary with respect to law, informal procedures, 
effectiveness, and predictability of procedures. Lack of bankruptcies in a 
country does not necessarily mean lack of insolvency procedures. 
  3Informal work-outs are common and well established in many countries. 
On the other hand, the existence of insolvency law does not necessarily 
imply that it has much influence on procedures, and in some countries 
procedures are neither well established nor predictable. Legal traditions 
and cultural factors affect the attitude to bankruptcy, and procedures for 
dealing with insolvency. Political factors affecting objectives of formal 
law and informal procedures vary across countries and time. Political 
influences on the banking system, and concentrated ownership of 
corporations forming strong vested interests can affect the allocation of 
credit and state subsidies in such a way that insolvency procedures are 
seriously undermined. We return to all these issues.  
        We view the bankruptcy process as one part of the more general exit 
process, which in turn is part of firm and project turnover. This turnover 
links directly to economic growth as outlined in Chapter 1 of this volume. 
There, dynamic efficiency was defined as the minimization of the costs 
associated with two types of business mistakes. One type of cost is the 
result of keeping “losers” alive too long. The other type of cost is the 
result of preventing winners from developing. We return to these types of 
costs below. 
       The economic roles of insolvency procedures are discussed in 
Section 2 with an emphasis on dynamic aspects. The concept of 
efficiency of insolvency procedures is discussed in Section 3. We 
distinguish between ex ante and ex post efficiency. Since efficiency 
ultimately must be evaluated in terms of its dynamic effects, simple 
efficiency criteria are not easily identified. In Section 4 formal insolvency 
procedures in different countries are classified as more or less creditor or 
debtor oriented. Legal approaches can also be classified as more or less 
contractual or statutory. The important roles of informal procedures are 
discussed in Section 5.Thereafter we turn, in Section 6, to the empirical 
  4evidence on bankruptcy and restructuring in a number of countries with 
substantial differences in legal approaches to insolvency. We ask what 
the data can tell about the design of efficient insolvency law, and in 
Section 7 we study the great differences in bankruptcy frequencies across 
countries. We ask whether the relatively high frequency of bankruptcies 
in Sweden relative to Germany, the UK and the USA is an indication of 




2. The Role of Insolvency Law and Procedures
2 
“Bankruptcy is a collective procedure for the recovery of debts by 
creditors.  It also protects individuals who have become overburdened by 
their debts.” (Wood, 1995 Preface) 
          This quote summarizes the very direct functions of bankruptcy and 
restructuring laws. From a creditor’s point of view bankruptcy law 
specifies how debt can be recovered from a distressed firm unable to pay 
all creditors fully. From a debtor’s point of view bankruptcy provides a 
resolution of claims on the debtor, whose resources thereby can be 
devoted to new ventures if the law allows the debtor to be relieved of 
unpaid debt. This important role for debtors is often neglected. It allows 
the debtor to allocate current available resources to projects based on 
expected future returns rather than to repayment of old debt. There is a 
potential trade-off between the debtors’ and the creditors’ points of view, 
since relieving debtors of responsibility for debt reduces the funds 
available for creditors. 
      In the broader perspective of the experimentally organized economy 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 6 in this volume the role of insolvency law is 
                                                 
2 This section is based on Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay, with Hussain (2001) 
  5to contribute to economic growth by maximizing the potential for 
“winners” to appear and develop. Winners are obviouly not easily 
identified ex ante but insolvency procedures can contribute in two way. 
First, by removing “losers” resources are freed up allowing the trial and 
error process to flourish in the experimental economy. Second, by 
allowing potential winners in temporary distress from floundering, 
resources are kept in projects with long term value. We discuss in more 
detail below how these abstract concepts of efficiency can be made more 
operational.   
          From an efficiency point of view, it is obviously important that 
bankruptcy procedures are speedy and that they provide legal security in 
the sense that there is predictability with respect to factors affecting the 
outcome. Without predictability of contracts or law specifying, for 
example, priority among creditors, conflicts of interest between the 
debtor and creditors, and among creditors will block efficient resolutions 
of claims.  Expecting such a situation, rational debtors will try to recover 
loans as soon as they suspect a borrower to be heading for distress.  Thus, 
positive value projects may be prematurely abandoned, if one or more 
creditors are able to recover loans in order to preempt other creditors’ 
claims.   
         It is commonly assumed that procedures are speedy and predictable, 
while costs of slow and unpredictable procedures are considered 
transactions costs and, as such, often neglected. In this paper we separate 
the discussion of law from the discussion of enforcement. When the 
principles of laws are discussed, it is assumed that enforcement is 
effective. In developing countries this assumption is obviously far from 
reality. Also in developed countries enforcement is often deficient. We 
return to these issues. 
  6     In the remainder of this section we first define efficient procedures in 
a narrow ex post sense as a background for a discussion of the economic 
role of insolvency procedures. In the following section, the efficiency 
concept is broadened. 
Economic and financial distress 
         In Table 1, a distinction is made between “economic distress” and 
“financial distress.”  In “economic distress” the net present value of the 
firm’s assets are negative and from a financial valuation point of view, 
the firm should be shut down in its present form.  The firms in economic 
distress are the “losers” in the terminology of Chapter 1. It is possible, 
however, that there are differences in assessment among financial market 
participants and that physical assets under different management would 
produce a positive net present value. In these cases, it would be efficient 
to auction or sell the firm as a “going concern” to new owners that would 
be able to improve management.  
          Under “financial distress,” the present value of the expected cash 
flows generated by the assets is positive but the firm’s debts exceed the 
present value of these cash flows. Thus, the firm is insolvent but its assets 
produce a positive value from a social point of view.  In this case, debt-
reduction and restructuring, possibly in combination with more 
fundamental restructuring, such as change in control, might be efficient at 
the time of distress. It is possible that potential “winners” are among the 
financially distressed firms. 
A firm may find itself in financial distress also because of 
liquidity constraints even if the present value of cash flows from assets 
exceeds the debts. This situation presumes that the financial system for 
one reason or another fails in its role of providing liquidity to solvent 
firms. The remedy might be change of ownership, rescheduling of debt, 
or liquidity infusion (see also Chapter 4 on venture capital). 
  7The difficulty of designing optimal insolvency procedures is to a 
large extent caused by information problems and asymmetries of 
information about the cause of distress.  The procedures must be 
determined ex ante before distress occurs for lenders to be able to 
evaluate credit risk, and in order to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest. 
At the time of distress, shareholders and debtors may want to claim 
different reasons for distress without either party being able to clearly 
prove its claim. Only for firms with an extremely simple structure of 
stakeholders would it be possible to resolve conflicts in an efficient 
manner if no pre-commitments have been made. Thus, without ex ante 
insolvency procedures firms will tend to remain simple in their 
stakeholder structure or be organized with the objective of reducing the 
probability of bankruptcy in for example conglomerates.  
Even if insolvency procedures in principle can resolve the 
problems discussed the efficiency of the procedures will depend on the 
efficiency of the financial system more broadly. Various market failures 
in this system can prevent, for example, efficient credit evaluation 
procedures from developing or may encourage excessive risk-taking. 
Deposit insurance systems are often considered sources of weak credit 
evaluation systems in banks. Under these conditions the bankruptcy 
procedures will not necessarily force economically distressed firm to 
close and allow financially distressed firms to survive.  
         Insolvency procedures, should not only resolve a distress situation 
but the resolution should be accomplished at the lowest possible costs. 
Altman (1984) and Altman and Vanderhoof (1994) studied direct and 
  8indirect bankruptcy costs in the USA and found them substantial in many 
industries.
3  
Table 1, Types of distress in about here 
 
Insolvency procedures in growth and crisis 
        Insolvency procedures provide only one way to restructure an 
economy where assets need to be reallocated continuously in response to 
changes in preferences, technology and human skill. Mergers and 
acquisitions, internal restructuring within conglomerates, and voluntary 
closings of firms with associated asset sales offer alternatives in the 
restructuring process. Thus, insolvency procedures should be seen in the 
larger context of their contribution to restructuring. In the framework of 
the experimentally organized economy insolvency procedures contribute 
to the removal of “losers” and thereby they free up resources for 
experimentation with potential “winners”.   
          Insolvency procedures can be the cause of a crisis if economically 
distressed firms do not shut down, but accumulate losses over time until 
the banking system and the government no longer find the costs of 
support bearable.  Disincentives for bankruptcy in combination with a 
politically influenced banking system, and state support of banks and 
firms contributed to the depth of crisis in some Asian economies 
according to several observers (see e.g. Pomerleano, 1999, and Hussain 
and Wihlborg, 1999). 
      The former socialist economies had and some still have these 
characteristics.
4 Disincentives for bankruptcy were initially created by the 
possibility of government support of formerly state-owned enterprises. 
Such support is still forthcoming in some transition economies. Even if 
                                                 
3 Direct bankruptcy costs are, for example, lawyers’ fees, while indirect costs may be caused by lost 
sales, or added costs of inputs in a distress-situation. Expected costs of this kind can exceed 10 percent 
of a firm’s value well in advance of distress. Weiss (1997) obtain lower estimates of bankruptcy costs. 
4 See Gangopadhyay and Wihlborg with Hussain, 2001 
  9this type of support has bee abandoned, and modern bankruptcy laws 
have been instituted, there are disincentives caused by costly, drawn out 
and possibly corrupt proceedings. Under these circumstances creditors 
may not find it worth-wile to put a firm into bankruptcy. 
         An existing crisis may be deepened and prolonged if financially 
distressed firms are not rehabilitated but are forced to shut down. 
Similarly, a crisis is deepened, if liquidity problems cause the shut-down 
of operations in a credit crunch. Widespread financial distress may be 
caused by a severe macro-economic shock, large exchange rate changes, 
or increases in interest rates. We certainly observed this type on 
deepening of a crisis in the hard hit Asian economies, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand (Hussain and Wihlborg, 1999). Thus the crises ay 
have been deepened both by accumulated economically distressed firm, 
and firms that became financially distressed in the crises. 
         There is also strong evidence that the lack of effective insolvency 
procedures contribute to banking-crisis, and the ability of banks to 
recover from crisis. Caprio Jr and Klingebiel (1996) study severe banking 
crises in 69 countries between 1980 and 1995. Crises in 26 countries are 
studied in more detail with respect to their causes. In a large share of the 
26 countries politically influenced lending practices of banks were seen 
as a contributing cause of the crisis. An inefficient legal framework 
hindered the resolution of crises in many of them.
5  
 
3. Ex post versus ex ante efficiency with specific assets 
       The principle of ex post efficiency stating that if a firm’s assets 
generate a positive net present value, then the firm should continue in 
                                                 
5 Debt recovery was hampered by the legal system in the following heterogeneous group of countries 
with recent banking crises: Benin, the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Madagascar, Senegal, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Brazil, and Hungary.  These observations indicate that a large number of countries with different legal 
traditions on all continents have insolvency procedures that contribute to or prolong economic crises. 
  10operation, is simple but not easily applied. One reason is that information 
about the present value of future cash flows and the competence to assess 
value is not easily accessible and asymmetrically distributed among 
managers, shareholders and lenders. There are also conflicts of interest 
among these stakeholders. All information is not voluntarily disclosed. 
One solution to this problem is to auction the firm or its assets. This 
solution is applied in many countries without explicit restructuring law. 
In countries with explicit restructuring laws an independent body with 
enforcement powers, such as a court, is required in order to come to a 
conclusion with respect to the value of the firm, and to determine the 
value-maximizing course of action. One course of action is to allow the 
current owner to retain ownership. Under an auction system this action 
would occur only if the owner is able to bid higher than others. 
      One reason why the present owner may value the firm higher than 
others is that he or she may have “invested” in, or acquired firm-specific 
human capital (knowledge).  Since this specific knowledge would be lost 
if the present owner would not be able to remain owner after distress, he 
or she may value the firm as a going concern higher than others. 
     Several stakeholders may have invested in specific capital that would 
be lost if a firm were terminated as a going concern.  First, many 
employees may have skills that would not provide any return if they went 
to work for other firms. Second, suppliers, customers, the surrounding 
community, the municipality and the state may have strong interests in 
the continuation of the particular activity of the distressed firm. All 
stakeholders with specific assets invested in a firm have a strong interest 
in the firm’s survival, and actually a willingness to pay for its survival. 
Thus, they would be willing to reduce their charges for the distressed 
firm’s use of their services.  They would thereby contribute to the 
survival of productive activities in an efficient manner.  
  11            It is possible that employees or the public sector are not able or 
willing to reduce their charges for their services to the firm. If so, there 
would be a social good of  having a distressed firm survive under the old 
ownership without risking that the firm could be shut down if it is 
declared bankrupt and liquidated. Employment considerations in 
particular have led many countries to favor restructuring over bankruptcy. 
Wood (1995) observes that legislation favoring restructuring has 
generally been implemented after severe economic downturns, when the 
consequences of bankruptcies have been felt.  After WWII employment 
and “job security” considerations have been important and explicit policy 
concerns.  As a result, a number of countries have legislated in favor of 
rehabilitation and restructuring of distressed firms to discourage 
bankruptcies.  
             The specific assets invested in a firm by the public sector or the 
community in general can also motivate a degree of forgiveness by the 
public sector when firms face distress. One way of implementing such 
forgiveness is to put a relatively low priority on tax claims on a firm. 
Thereby the likelihood that unpaid taxes lead to bankruptcy is reduced. 
Countries differ in terms of the priority tax liabilities have on bankruptcy. 
Several countries including Sweden have lowered the priority of tax 
claims during the last decade. 
     Insolvency procedures affect economic incentives not only 
at the time of distress but also at the time various stakeholders enter 
contracts with the still healthy firm.  The probability of, and the 
procedure for resolution of distress will therefore affect the incentives of 
various stakeholders to invest in firm-specific assets.  Furthermore, the 
procedures will affect the willingness of different groups of creditors to 
supply financing. Insolvency procedures that increase the likelihood of 
firms’ survival in financial distress increase the incentives of stakeholders 
  12to invest in firm-specific capital. If these procedures reduce the expected 
return of creditors, the supply of financing would decrease, however. 
Therefore, effective procedures should enable restructuring when 
profitable, while allowing creditors to claim repayment to the extent 
possible. Arrangements for security against loans enable creditors to 
obtain ex ante contractual conditions for repayment.  
The importance of ex ante incentives of stakeholders for 
investments in a firm imply that predictability of insolvency procedures is 
important. Arbitrariness of court procedures, corruption of judges, and 
political influences on procedures are common in developing countries in 
particular. The supply of external financing and investments in specific 
assets are reduced under these conditions. Thereby, potential “winners” 
may never get off the ground. 
An economic efficiency analysis of these considerations is 
sensitive to, for example, assumptions about the relation between asset 
specificity and return on projects, the substitutability between general and 
specific assets, and the supply of debt financing. Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1996), and Bebchuk and Picker (1993) ask how risky project choices 
requiring investment in specific skills are affected by the relative position 
of creditors and shareholders/managers in bankruptcy. They find that 
allowing managers/shareholders to retain a stake in the assets in case of 
bankruptcy (deviation from absolute priority) may enhance ex ante 
efficiency under limited liability. Frierman and Viswanath (1995) show 
that deviations from absolute priority can reduce the agency problem 
between shareholders and lenders. Accordingly, there will be less excess 
risk-taking. The analyses in these papers favor deviations from absolute 
priority in bankruptcy. In other words, they argue that debtors should be 
able to retain a stake in the assets of insolvent firms. 
  13The above arguments are contradicted by analyses concluding 
that absolute priority increases the supply of financing (Bebchuk, 2000). 
Gangopadhyay and Wihlborg (2003) show that both specific skill 
development and the supply of financing increase under stricter 
procedures favoring creditors. They show that under conditions of credit 
rationing the mentioned arguments favoring deviations from absolute 
priority are nullified or reversed. 
None of the mentioned papers assign an explicit role to 
monitoring of debtors with limited liability. Cornelli and Felli (1996) link 
the incentives to monitor to the position of senior and junior creditors in 
bankruptcy. Assuming that monitoring is a productive activity they find 
that neither absolute priority nor a more debtor friendly rule is efficient 
with respect to monitoring incentives of all creditors. In other words, the 
issue of the ex ante efficient distribution of assets in bankruptcy remains 
unresolved even when a rather narrow range of specific assets is 
considered.  What can be said is that ex ante efficiency is enhanced if: 
1.Insolvency procedures are flexible enough to allow different types of 
resolutions for firms with different types of stake-holders. 
2. Recontracting is possible for services provided with specific assets. 
 3. Insolvency procedures are well-defined ex ante.  In other words, the 
rules for dealing with insolvency should not be subject to uncertainty. 
4.Insolvency procedures allow speedy resolution of distress. 
 
4. Classifying Insolvency Procedures
6 
      It is common to denote insolvency procedures as either creditor-
oriented or debtor-oriented. These terms indicate whether the procedures 
tend to favor creditors or debtors in terms of claims on the distressed 
firm’s assets, and in terms of control over these assets in and after legal 
                                                 
6 This section is based on Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay with Hussain (2001) 
  14proceedings for bankruptcy or restructuring. The existence of an easily 
accessible restructuring law generally implies a degree of debtor 
orientation since such a law—if it is mandatory-- implies that there is a 
constraint on the range of contractual solutions to distress situations. 
Incumbent owners are permitted to retain a stake and control after 
insolvency. Informal workouts leading to smaller stakes being retained by 
incumbent owners are thereby hindered. The degree to which 
restructuring law limits the range of informal contractual solutions 
depends on the ease of access to the debtor benefits implied by 
restructuring.  
        The degree of creditor or debtor orientation is not unambiguous as 
we shall argue below. A possibly more interesting classification of law 
from an analytical point of view is the degree to which it enables firms 
and creditors to negotiate ex ante contracts that will be recognized in 
formal bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings. A distinction can be 
made between contractual approaches and statutory approaches to 
insolvency law. The contractual approach implies that the law enables 
firms and stakeholders to reach voluntary contractual arrangements that 
remain valid in bankruptcy. For example, the law may specify a number 
of arrangements for pledging assets and their priority in insolvency.
7 The 
statutory approach implies that contractual arrangements between a firm 
and its stakeholders are abrogated in insolvency and that special statutes 
apply in this situation. Firms seeking protection against creditors under 
Chapter 11 in US insolvency law is an example of this approach. In 
Ch.11 negotiations among creditors and management determine the 
position of different creditors in a restructured firm independently of their 
priority before insolvency occurred. 
                                                 
7 Wihlborg (2001) discusses the dynamic efficiency enhancing properties of enabling as opposed to 
mandatory law. 
  15     From an ex post efficiency point of view we want to evaluate whether 
procedures allow ”excessive survival”-or “excessive shut-downs” 
oriented quite independent of whether control changes hands or not. 
Survival of a firm is possible even if liquidation is the result of formal 
procedures, because an insolvent firm’s assets can be sold as a “”going 
concern”. The assets can even be sold back to the original owners. 
Furthermore, creditors can agree on a informal work-out prior to 
bankruptcy with conditions for the owners. Thus, an evaluation of the 
survival-orientation of  insolvency procedures requires that incentives for 
informal work-outs, and incentives for the sale of assets as a “going 
concern” are analyzed. These incentives are naturally strongly influenced 
by the design of formal insolvency law, its application and enforcement.  
     It would be most interesting to evaluate the orientation of procedures 
relative to an efficiency-benchmark but for reasons discussed such a 
benchmark is not easily determined. The “optimal” orientation in any 
dimension may vary across industries, and the nature of shocks causing 
insolvency. This variation is in itself an argument for a contractual 
approach. 
    We begin by discussing determinants of creditor and debtor 
orientation, and the recognition of ex ante contracts in formal law. Laws 
in different countries are also compared. Restructuring law and its 
different elements is the subject of the next section before presenting 
evidence on the survival and shut-down orientation of laws in different 
countries. 
Table 2 in about here 
     Table 2, based on Wood (1995), ranks countries insolvency laws in 
terms of creditor-debtor orientation. Wood defines a creditor-oriented law 
as one that recognizes the claims of creditors to the greatest extent in 
  16insolvency. A debtor-oriented law allows debtors to retain a stake and/or 
control in insolvency although there is no equity left in the firm. 
      Table 2 rates traditional British law as the most creditor-oriented, and 
current French law as the most debtor-oriented. The implementation of 
formal procedures for restructuring (administration) in 1985 and 1986 has 
made British law less creditor-oriented but it is still rated as marginally 
more creditor oriented than German, Dutch and Swedish law. Japanese 
and US laws are rated in the middle as more creditor-oriented than 
Italian, Spanish, and French law. Most developing countries base their 
insolvency laws on the law of the former colonial power, while the 
former members of the communist block seem to have adopted an 
insolvency law akin to one of the Western European laws. 
        The main determinants of the degree of creditor-orientation of 
insolvency procedures are listed in Table 3. Increasing the scope and 
efficiency of security allows more financing against collateral with 
greater probability for the secured creditors to keep the claim intact. On 
the other hand, the stronger the position of secured creditors, the less 
likely it is that unsecured creditors, employees, and the state will be paid 
in insolvency.  
     The existence of a rehabilitation statute or restructuring law reduces or 
weakens the position of creditors, because debtors are able to seek 
protection against some or all creditors, and it allows a search for a court-
led solution with control and a remaining stake for the debtor. From 
creditors’ point of view restructuring law may have the advantage that 
debtors have a stronger incentive to maximize the value of the assets even 
when distress can be foreseen. These incentives depend on the prospects 
for an informal work-out, however. It is possible that under some 
circumstances a stronger position of creditors enhances the likelihood of a 
work-out. We return to this issue below. 
  17      If the law allows set-offs in insolvency, then some unsecured 
creditors have a de facto security in the form of a debt to the insolvent 
firm. 
       Recognition of ownership of assets in the possession of the debtor 
but not formally owned by the same is a controversial issue and 
ambiguous from the point of view of creditor-orientation. Clearly, if 
assets in a trust are deemed to belong to the estate of the insolvent firm it 
increases the funds available for creditors. On the other hand, recognition 
of ownership to assets in a trust can be seen as recognition of ex ante 
contractual relations, which is also the principle of recognition of 
security. 
      Whether the veil of incorporation and therefore limited liability of 
shareholders, and protection of directors against personal liability actually 
protects creditors or not can be debated depending on circumstances, but 
upholding the protection offered by the veil in insolvency can also be 
seen as recognition of ex ante contractual relations.  
   The upshot of this discussion is that increasing creditor orientation as 
defined above amounts to the increased recognition of ex ante contractual 
relations after the filing for bankruptcy or restructuring. Thus, strong 
creditor orientation is consistent with an enabling contractual approach, 
while debtor orientation is consistent with a statutory approach to formal 
restructuring. 
 
 Table 3  Determinants of creditor orientation in here 
 
       The US legal system is very debtor friendly in terms of prospects for 
rehabilitation under Ch.11, but relatively creditor friendly in other 
dimensions, and, therefore, in bankruptcy.  
  18       Since one objective of insolvency law is to keep viable entities alive 
the role of formal rehabilitation or restructuring proceedings is 
particularly interesting. This topic is discussed next. 
 
5.  Formal and Informal Restructuring  
 
In Table 3 the existence and design of restructuring law is 
considered an important determinant of creditor orientation of 
insolvency law. A number of factors determine the probability that a 
debtor retains a stake in, and control over a rehabilitated firm. These 
different factors are listed in Table 4.The factors printed in bold face 
are considered particularly important for the prospects of the debtor in 
insolvency, and for the incentives to use restructuring law.  A “weak” 
restructuring law implies that entering proceedings under the law leads 
to a protective freeze on creditors’ actions but not to any fundamental 
distortion of creditors’ rights. A “strong” restructuring law in the 
Tables means that entering proceedings leads to significant erosion of 
creditor rights with preservation of the debtor’s estate and the debtor’s 
possibility of survival in control. Thus, a weak (or no) restructuring 
law strengthens the position of the creditor while a strong 
restructuring law is considered debtor friendly.  
Table 4 here 
    Most countries—even those with strongly creditor-oriented laws 
--allow for so called compositions implying a moratorium on the 
payment of debts and the possibilities for a negotiated restructuring of 
creditors’ claims. These composition procedures are very rarely used 
because of requirements for immediate payments of a share of non-
secured creditors’ claims (Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden and others), or because the debtor must show that insolvency 
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Luxembourg).  
       More debtor-friendly restructuring law has been implemented 
in recent decades in a number of countries. The French law of 1967 
changed the orientation of French law strongly. Chapter 11 of the US 
bankruptcy code was enacted in 1978. British “administration 
proceedings” have been possible since 1986. Australia allowed formal 
restructuring in 1992, while Germany and Sweden have enacted 
restructuring laws in 1994 and 1996 but the latter two laws are not 
much different from already existing composition laws. We return to 
this issue in Section 6. 
       Among the countries in Table 4 the UK, Germany and Japan 
have “weak” restructuring laws. A weak law in the sense described 
has the consequence that the incentives for a debtor to seek protection 
under the law are relatively weak.  It can also be seen in Table 4 that 
entry into restructuring proceedings is “not easy” in the same 
countries. In fact the number of restructuring cases in these countries 
is very small (in the order of magnitude of a few to 10 percent of the 
number of bankruptcy cases) as will be shown later. One important 
reason for the small number of cases is that the laws specify that assets 
be large enough to pay unsecured creditors a certain fraction of their 
claims. Once insolvency occurs it is rare that there are sufficient assets 
for this purpose after secured creditors have been paid. Incentives to 
enter restructuring are also weakened if contractual obligations are not 
abrogated as in bankruptcy.  
Modern French law (redressement judiciaire and reglement 
amiable), American law (Chapter 11), Spanish law and Italian law are 
“strong.”  Table 4 shows that in both France and the U.S, it is “easy” 
for a debtor to seek protection against creditors. The courts will accept 
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viable entity.  In Spain, on the other hand, entry is not considered 
“easy” although the debtor’s position is strong once restructuring 
proceedings have begun.       
         The laws differ in terms of their protection of various claims 
on the debtor. In particular, secured creditors are protected in countries 
with “weak” laws but not in countries with “strong” laws.  These 
differences reflect the objectives of the law.  While British law is 
oriented towards upholding contracts, French law in particular 
explicitly gives the courts the role of keeping firms in operation, and 
preserving employment. 
     The control over the firm in restructuring shifts to the courts or 
to a person assigned by the court to different degrees.  In countries 
with weak restructuring laws, management loses control.  Under Ch. 
11 in the U.S., the management retains control, under court 
supervision.  In other countries with “strong” laws, the influence of 
management is up to the courts and depends on the court’s objectives.  
In France in particular the courts’ powers are used to protect 
employees and the role of the old management is subordinated to this 
objective. 
     The differences among restructuring laws reflect not only their 
objectives but, most likely, the different organizations of financial 
systems and the rules for banking.  Kaiser (1994) observes that 
American banks are reluctant to get involved in corporate decisions, 
because they may be held liable for bad advice (lender’s liability). 
There are many alternative sources of financing in the American 
marketplace in particular, with the result that a corporation’s financial 
structure  is often complex with a large number of creditor groups 
with conflicting interests.  A negotiated informal work-out involving 
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(Baird 1997 a and b). There is always a risk that one creditor demands 
full, immediate repayment, thus preventing a negotiated settlement.  
Accordingly, the courts are able to bind dissenters in Ch. 11 
proceedings. 
     German and Japanese financial markets are bank-oriented, and 
banks are deeply involved in corporate decision making.  One bank tends 
to serve as the “house-bank” and main senior creditor of each 
corporation.  The house-bank is well-informed about the economic 
situation of the firm, and it can initiate informal work-out negotiations.  
Therefore the banks determine the treatment of insolvent firms in the vast 
majority of insolvencies. Also in the UK banks tend to lead informal 
work-outs although the position of banks in corporate control is weaker 
than on the continent (see Franks and Sussman, 2000). British banks do 
not risk liability to the extent American banks do, however. 
     Rehabilitation proceedings or restructurings have a low success 
rate in most countries, including France and the U.S. where the 
proceedings are relatively accessible. Kaiser (1994) presents data for the 
U.S.A., Germany, France and the U.K. The data for insolvency cases in 
the U.K. show that around 11,000 cases in 1993 went directly to 
bankruptcy proceedings, while nearly 3,000 went into restructuring of 
which around two thirds ended up  in liquidation. 
     In Germany prior to 1999 when the law of 1994 went into effect, 
composition proceedings were extremely rare. (See Section 7). For all 
practical purposes firms went bankrupt and were liquidated, or banks 
organized work-outs.  The situation is the same in most countries with 
conventional composition as the only formal restructuring procedure.  
The laws in Germany were amended in 1994 to include a limited stay on 
enforcement of security but these changes have made little difference.  
  22The experiences are similar in Sweden where composition was changed 
into a “weak” restructuring law in 1996. Data on this issue are presented 
in Section 7. 
     In the U.S. the number of cases confirmed for reorganization under 
Ch. 11 seems to be on the order of magnitude of 10 percent of firms 
liquidated or applying for reorganization (Wood, 1995).  Nearly 20 
percent of those filing for Ch. 11 are confirmed for reorganization 
(Kaiser, 1994).  The time between filing and confirmation is counted in 
years.  Thus, the share of insolvency cases that end up in reasonably 
speedy liquidation is much lower than in Germany and the U.K. 
     For France Kaiser reports a success rate of about 15 percent of 
firms entering some kind of restructuring proceedings.  The number of 
such firms seems to be about twice the number in the U.K.  If we classify 
the countries as relatively liquidation- vs. restructuring-oriented based on 
these observations, Germany is clearly the most liquidation-oriented 
country followed by the UK. 
     In both the U.S. and France most firms filing for Ch. 11 or 
applying for restructuring end up being liquidated but the time it takes to 
get there is longer.  The experience in France is that many of the firms 
being restructured - often for reasons of preserving employment – return 
to insolvency after some time.  In the U.S., the firms exiting from Ch. 11 
seem to survive more often. However, Ch. 11 allows many insolvent 
firms to live for a year or two, only to end up being liquidated. 
        In order to evaluate whether restructuring law actually 
contributes to the survival of viable entities, or only allows economically 
distressed firms an extended life under legal protection, we have to 
compare effects of restructuring law with incentives of creditors to 
contribute to informal work-outs with or without the incumbent 
management.  
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6. Stylized facts about bankruptcy and survival 
             To what extent are financially distressed firms rehabilitated in 
informal work-outs, and to what extent are economically distressed firms 
allowed to survive under different insolvency regimes?  An efficient 
bankruptcy system would sort “losers” and potential “winners” in such a 
way that only the former are closed down. Nevertheless, potential 
“winners” may go through liquidation in bankruptcy and be purchased by 
new owners who run the firms under new management. Thus, to evaluate 
insolvency systems we need to look for firms being closed down in spite 
of being viable entities, and “loser-firms” being allowed to survive. 
   In this section we look at empirical evidence in the literature that 
may have a bearing on the efficiency of different insolvency law regimes. 
We focus here on industrialized countries. Data for emerging market 
countries are presented in Wihlborg and Gangopadhyay with Hussain 
(2001).. 
Thorburn (2000) analyzes the results of 300 liquidation cases in 
Sweden between 1987 and 1991. She finds that in 75 percent of the cases 
the bankrupt firms survived as “going concerns”.  Sweden has a strongly 
creditor oriented law and allows floating charges like the UK. 
Restructuring law was and remains inaccessible. The procedure employed 
by the courts in bankruptcy is “cash auction” of the firms, meaning that 
the courts take over the insolvent firm and try to sell the whole entity to 
the highest bidder in a speedy manner. The liquidation of the whole entity 
is often “pre-packaged” by a lead-bank that has found and organized the 
financing for a buyer of the firm.  It also happens that the buyer is the old 
owner who obtains a loan from the bank to buy the firm after liquidation. 
In the latter case, the bank as the secured creditor has organized a 
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creditors. 
     Stromberg (2000) argues that the Swedish cash auction system 
leads to a sale of assets back to the original owner when the bank benefits 
from this solution, and that the probability of such a sale-back increases 
with the specificity of the firm’s assets.  Thus, it seems that the auction 
system, to a large extent, accomplishes what restructuring laws are 
designed to accomplish. 
     The high survival rate of the liquidated entities in these cases is  
surprising taking into consideration the fact that the data do not cover 
informal work-outs. No doubt the role of the bank in pre-packaging deals 
before auctions is crucial in explaining the survival rate.  The figures 
indicate that criticism of highly creditor-oriented insolvency procedures 
on the grounds that they cause too many shut-downs of firms can be 
questioned. 
Franks and Sussman (2000) present complementary evidence for 
Britain. They show in a study of three banks’ handling of distressed firms 
that the banks have implemented elaborate informal rescue processes. 
The majority of distressed firms remain outside formal procedures, and 
the rate of liquidation does not seem particularly high, when banks 
remain in control of the insolvency procedure.  
        Wood (1995) notes that a common observation of bankruptcy 
lawyers is that the greatest disincentive for informal work-outs of distress 
situations is the existence of relatively debtor friendly restructuring law.  
The evidence for Sweden and the UK confirms this observation. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the existence of strong 
restructuring law (France, U.S.) allows a greater survival rate for 
financially distressed but viable firms as compared to countries with no or 
ineffective restructuring laws (U.K., Germany, Sweden). The caveat to be 
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economic conditions.  
       The high survival rate of firms in the Swedish court auction system 
has been thrown into doubt after the banking crisis of 1991-1993. Most of 
the data in the cited studies refer to the period before the crisis. There has 
been much criticism of the Swedish banks’ eagerness to liquidate 
relatively small firms during the crisis. It seems that they (with one 
exception) abandoned their role as house-banks providing liquidity in 
hard times, and liquidated many small but viable firms in which owners 
could not offer additional collateral when asset prices and the value of 
collateral fell.
8 The result of the liquidations--once asset prices recovered-
-was a gigantic transfer of wealth to banks and other firms which 
obtained the collateral assets of the liquidated firms, as well as a 
seemingly high rate of shut-downs of viable relatively small entities.
9 The 
Penser case is particularly well-known and still in the courts. Nordbanken 
bought Erik Penser’s controlling shares in an insolvent firm during the 
crisis. At the time, the market value of real estate serving as collateral for 
loans was low. The banks later sold the real estate at prices far above the 
prices at the time of insolvency. According to Swedish law, the bank 
must not profit from the sale of collateral after bankruptcy, but the excess 
value should go back to the original owners. In the Penser case, the 
structure of cross-ownership among Penser’s firms and the contractual 
relations among these firms and the banks were very complex and the 
cause of dispute about the rights to the realized asset values. 
                                                 
8There is no hard evidence supporting these statements but there are a very large number of court cases 
wherein banks have been sued with little success for breach of credit promises.  
 
9 The banking crisis in Sweden occurred during a very severe recession with substantial asset deflation. 
It also happened at a time when stricter capital requirements were imposed on the banks, weakening 
their incentives to supply liquidity. 
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is that the absence of restructuring law has not hindered the survival of 
viable firms in financial distress during normal times, and probably 
speeded up the shut-down of economically distressed firms.  
          An important question is whether a system with easier access to 
formal restructuring could function better during crisis periods when the 
financial system seems to fail in its ability to provide financing to viable 
entities. Formal reorganization procedures may have the advantage of 
providing more time for alternative bidders to appear. The cost would be 
that the life of economically distressed firms may be prolonged as well. It 
is possible that the only effective remedy against failures of the 





7. Bankruptcy Frequency in Sweden in an international comparison.  
In this section bankruptcy frequencies in a number of countries are 
compared. We focus especially on Swedish bankruptcies during the 
period 1985-1996 in comparison to the other Scandinavian countries, 
Finland, Germany, UK, and USA. One objective is to analyze whether 
there is a relation between frequency of bankruptcy and creditor 
orientation of insolvency law. A second objective is to study whether 
relatively high bankruptcy frequencies in macroeconomic crisis periods 
indicate that bankruptcy law is ill equipped to resolve insolvencies during 
such periods. We will see that these questions are not easily answered, 
because bankruptcy data do not mean the same in all countries. The 
                                                 
10 The role capital requirements play in supplying liquidity in a macroeconomic crisis is another factor 
deserving research. 
  27differences in data across countries reflect the different procedures 
leading to liquidation.  
        We have data for corporate bankruptcies (that lead to liquidation) for 
the period 1985 to 1996 for the following countries; Sweden
11, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark, USA, Germany and Great Britain. The non-
comparability of the data across countries is encountered immediately. 
For example, it is not possible to distinguish between bankruptcies of 
legal and natural persons in the Norwegian data. Through 1994 
bankruptcies of natural persons are included with bankruptcies of legal 
persons under the definition “statements missing”. To eliminate 
confusion, we have chosen to delete the bankruptcies that are included 
under this definition. This deletion implies that the number of 
bankruptcies is reduced for Norway in our comparisons. However, the 
numbers of removed bankruptcies are so small that the results are not 
affected.  
       There is another data problem for Germany. The data includes only 
West Germany through 1993 and thereafter the former East Germany as 
well. The German data differ also in another sense. Recorded 
bankruptcies include all petitions for bankruptcy that lead to liquidation. 
Petitions are not accepted if there are no assets to distribute to creditors, 
while in other countries there are no such restrictions. A firm that cannot 
pay any part of the claims on it will not be dealt with by the courts. Thus 
in an international comparison German bankruptcies are underestimated.  
        The data for the USA includes filings for bankruptcy under chapter 7 
(liquidation) but not Ch 11 bankruptcies, since the latter represent filings 
                                                 
11 The data for Sweden come from Statistiskacentralbyrån, for Finland from Statistikcentralen, for 
Norway from Statistic sentralbyrå, for Denmark from Denmarks statistics, For Germany from 
Statistisches Bundesamt. Several sources have been used in order to get front statistics for THE U.S.A.. 
The following sources have been used Bankruptcy Yearbook duck Almanac 1996, a web-based 
(http://www.law.missouri.edu/lawless/bus_bkr/body_filings.htm) article of Robert M. Lawless (2001) 
and data from Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
  28for protection in order to restructure. We discuss data on restructuring 
below. The UK data includes statistics from England, Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland) and the data capture compulsory 
liquidations and creditor’s voluntary liquidations.   
        We use two definitions for Sweden
12 in defining the companies; 
Sweden 1 and Sweden 2. Sweden 1 includes all the legal and natural 
persons that are registered for value-added tax and/or are employers
13. 
Sweden 2 includes only limited liability companies (aktiebolag) and 
economic associations (ekonomiska föreningar) with employed personnel 
or with a turnover over 50 000 SEK. Sweden 2 excludes financial 
companies (banks, insurance companies etc), the state-owned 
corporations plus the real estate industry. For Finland, the companies 
included are those that have to pay industry tax (näringsskatteskyldiga 
företag). For Denmark, companies that are registered for value-added tax 
are included. Thus, it seems that the company definitions are reasonably 
comparable. The companies in Germany
14 are those incurring fiscal 
liabilities above a minimum amount. Thus some very small German 
companies may not be included. 
          We begin by examining the total number of bankruptcies in 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Germany and the 
USA, during the period 1985 to 1996.  In Figure 1 and Table 5, we can 
see how the bankruptcies develop for each country. In order to compare 
countries we must set bankruptcies in relation to something. Gratzer 
(2000) chooses to relate bankruptcies to each country’s population. We 
                                                 
12 The numbers for Sweden comes from Statistiska centralbyrån, for Finland from Statistikcentralen, 
for Norway from Statistic sentralbyrå, for Denmark from Denmarks statistics, For Germany from 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Several sources have been used in order to get statistics for the USA Office of 
Advocacy and U.S. Census Bureau. 
13 When we measure companies by the number of employees, the number of employees as a 
measurement cannot be directly compared with other measurements of employment. 
14 With a taxable revenue of 20 000 DM between 1985-1987; from 1990 to 1994 over 25 000 DM; and 
for 1996 over 32 500 DM. 
 
  29choose to normalize with the number of employees from OECD:s Labour 
Force Statistics 2001
15. This normalization enables us to divide the firms 
into size classes later, as well as into industries.  
Table 5 here    
Figure 1 here 
        In figure 2, we see how bankruptcies develop for each country and 
which country/countries that has/have the largest number of bankruptcies 
per employee (see also Table 6). Sweden has on average the highest 
number of bankruptcies per employee for the entire period, and the 
highest number of bankruptcies per employee each year except 1988 and 
1989. Bankruptcies peaked in 1992. Norway and Finland are close to 
Sweden in terms of average bankruptcy frequency. The legal 
environments in these three countries are relatively similar. 
   As in Sweden bankruptcies peaked during the crisis in 1992. Norway’s 
banking crisis started a few years earlier and Norway had the highest 
frequency among the countries in 1988 and 1989. 
Table 6 here 
Figure 2 here 
            The development of Danish bankruptcies does not follow the 
same pattern as the other Nordic countries and the average frequency is 
half of the other Nordic countries. Bankruptcies peaked in 1993 and the 
fluctuations seem lower than in the other Nordic countries. The average 
frequency in the UK is similar to the Danish while it peaked in 1992. The 
fluctuations seem lower than in the Nordic high frequency countries. 
         The USA and Germany are the two countries with the lowest 
bankruptcy-frequencies during the period. We can therefore divide the 
countries into three groups. Group One, the high frequency group with 
large fluctuations, includes Sweden, Norway and Finland. Group Two, 
                                                 
15 We also use number of companies for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, USA and Germany. See below. 
  30the middle frequency group, contains Denmark and Great Britain, and 
Germany and the USA form the low frequency Group Three.  
        To test for the statistical significance of differences in average 
bankruptcy frequencies we use a parametric (one-sided Anova), as well 
as a non-parametric (Kruskall-Wallis) test.
16 In Table 6 the results 
indicate rejection of the hypothesis that the countries have an equal 
frequency of bankruptcy. In Table 7, we use Tamhanes test statistics to 
make pair wise comparisons. There is no statistically significant 
difference between Sweden, Norway and Finland. Sweden and Finland 
have a significantly larger average frequency of bankruptcy than the other 
countries except Norway. Norway has a statistically significantly larger 
number of bankruptcies per employee than Great Britain, the USA and 
Germany. Denmark has a statistically significantly larger average 
frequency of bankruptcy than the USA and Germany. Great Britain has a 
statistically significant larger number of bankruptcies per employee than 
the USA. Thus, the tests support the division of the countries into the 
three groups mentioned above.  
Table 7 here 
 
           We have also calculated the frequency of bankruptcies relative to 
the total number of firms in the countries. We examine the number of 
companies for the period, year 1985 to year 1996 and relate the number 
of bankruptcies to the number of companies. In Figure 3, we have used 
the total number of companies for Sweden1, Sweden2, Finland, 
Denmark, USA and Germany
17. We do not have the company data for 
                                                 
16 The null hypothesis is that all countries have an on average an equally large frequency of bankruptcy 
during the period. 
17 Only for Sweden1, Sweden2 and Denmark have we data for entire period, for the USA from year 
1988 and for Finland from year 1989. For Germany, we have for individual years, with two year's 
intervals (1986 to 1996). 
  31Norway and the UK but for the other countries it makes little difference 
whether frequency is measured relative to employees or firms.. 
Figure 3 here 
         Are there more bankruptcies in countries with strong creditor 
orientation of insolvency law? The three groupings are not internally 
similar with respect to creditor orientation of bankruptcy law. Sweden, 
Norway and Finland have similar relatively creditor oriented laws but UK 
law is considered even more creditor oriented in Table 2. The USA with 
its relatively debtor oriented law has the lowest frequency. Denmark’s 
placing in the intermediate group is consistent with Table 2. According to 
the same table Germany is as creditor oriented as Sweden, while in terms 
of frequency it is grouped with the USA.  Thus, if we are to believe in a 
relation between creditor orientation and bankruptcy frequency, Great 
Britain and Germany are outliers. The question is then whether the low 
observed bankruptcy frequencies for these two countries can be explained 
by other factors. For example, we have already noted that court 
procedures in Germany are such that fewer bankruptcies will be recorded 
for a certain number of liquidations. We return to this issue when 
considering the frequency of bankruptcies for zero employee firms, and, 
thereafter, when taking data for formal restructurings into account.  
 
Zero-employee bankruptcies in the data 
Companies with zero employees constitute a large share of the companies 
that went into bankruptcy in Sweden during the period 1985 to 1996. 
Bankruptcies with zero employees constitute between 60 and 70 percent 
of all bankruptcies between the years 1985-1996. We ask whether these 
companies explain the differences among bankruptcy frequencies and 
why there is such a high frequency of zero employee firms in the data. 
There are several possible explanations why we find firms going into 
  32bankruptcy having zero employees. Lundberg (1999) lists the following 
possible explanations: 
•  Operations are wound down before bankruptcy happens. 
•   The registration authority, Patent- and registreringsverket (PRV), 
has requested compulsory liquidation due to the fact that 
statements have not been submitted to PRV. 
•  Personnel have been transferred before bankruptcy into another 
company as an essential part of the reconstruction process. The 
bankrupt company may be part of a group of companies where the 
employees exists in a special company consisting of all the 
personnel and this company will not go into bankruptcy. 
•  The bankrupt company is included in a group of real estate 
companies where each piece of real estate lies in a limited 
partnership or trading company. The employees are in the head 
office. 
 
•  The bankrupt firm is a shell- company that has been created to 
reduce tax payments. 
According to Lundberg shell companies have contributed substantially to 
the statistics from 1987. If so, there is a high probability that a company 
is a shell company when a corporation with zero employees goes into 
bankruptcy. This would mean that tax avoidance could explain the high 
frequency of bankruptcies in for Sweden. Buttwill (2004) estimates that 
on the average there are around 1000 shell company bankruptcies per 
year in Sweden. This number would explain around 15 percent of the 
zero employee bankruptcies. Obviously, incentives for tax avoidance 
exist in other countries too. Thus, tax avoidance does not seem to explain 
the relatively high frequency of bankruptcies in Sweden. 
  33Figure 4 here 
       Unfortunately we have data for zero employee bankruptcies only in 
Sweden, Norway and Finland as shown in Figure 4. These countries are 
those with particularly high bankruptcy frequencies. Figure 5 and Table 8 
display the relationship between the number of bankruptcies with zero 
employees and the total number of bankruptcies for Sweden, Norway and 
Finland for the period 1985 to 1996
18. Norway actually has the largest 
average share of bankruptcies with zero employees (87 percent), 
thereafter follows Sweden with 65 percent and Finland with 57 percent. 
Table 9 shows the results of tests for the significance of the differences 
between the countries.  
Figure 5 here 
Table 8 here 
        In Sweden the proportion of bankruptcies with zero employees was 
lower during the crisis period 1991 –1994 when the total the number of 
bankruptcies was particularly high. These figures do not exclude the 
possibility that a normal winding up process of firms explain the data. We 
expect that a relatively large share of firms went bankrupt without having 
the time to go through a slow winding up process during the crisis 1991-
94.  
Table 9 here 
        The data indicate that having a large proportion of bankruptcies with 
zero employees is not unique for Sweden. It also seems that most of these 
bankruptcies were legitimate. Thus, they would be often be explained as 
the final step of a winding down process. In many cases, the firms may 
have restructured and shifted employees and operations to a closely 
                                                 
18 For Sweden, we have data for entire period, for Norway from 1987 to 1996 and for Finland from 
1989 to 1996.  For Norway, it is not entirely possible to separate bankruptcies by individuals from 
bankruptcies by companies. Up to 1994 do bankruptcies under the term statements missing include 
individual bankruptcies. We choose to delete those bankruptcies that are included under that term in 
order to eliminate confusion.  
  34related firm. In other cases, a small firm may never have taken off but 
from extremely modest beginnings. 
 
Formal restructuring data. 
Formal composition is an alternative to liquidation bankruptcies in 
Sweden, Germany, Finland and USA. Composition is a tool for 
restructuring of firms’ financial structure and operations. In the USA 
restructuring is formally carried out under Ch 11 of the bankruptcy code. 
In the UK “administration proceedings” make formal restructuring 
possible. Germany has had the restructuring law of 1994 in effect since 
1999. Sweden made access to formal restructuring marginally easier in 
1996. In Section 5 the ease of access to restructuring law in different 
countries was discussed and it was argued that ease of access implies a 
degree of debtor orientation of insolvency procedures. Legal obstacles to 
formal restructuring could take the form of high requirements of the 
amount of liquid assets left in company (Table 3). The differences across 
countries are great. Thus, the existence of restructuring law does not tell 
much about its use and effect on the restructuring process in a country.  
        In Section 5 some international evidence on restructuring was 
presented based on Kaiser (1994). It was noted that informal work-outs 
substitute for formal restructuring in countries with relatively inaccessible 
formal restructuring procedures. Evidence from Thorburn (2000) was 
referred to. She reports that 74 percent of the liquidations in her sample of 
Swedish firms filling for bankruptcy are going concern sales. One quarter 
of these sales are informally arranged “auction prepacks”
19. Thus 
liquidations do not generally imply piecemeal liquidation of firms. When 
                                                 
19 In an auction prepack the rights to the distressed company’s core assets have been transferred to a 
buyer in return for cash. The distressed company must file for bankruptcy since the payment for the 
rights of to the distressed company’s core assets is less than the company’s liabilities. In order for the 
prepacks sales agreements to take affect after filing for bankruptcy the contract must be formally 
approved by all the secured creditors and the bankruptcy trustee. 
  35the liquidation procedure is used as a part of a de facto reorganization, it 
is accomplished through a combination of private contract (informal 
procedure) and court based decisions (formal procedure). It can be 
expected that in countries with very accessible formal restructuring 
procedures very few informal procedures occur, since the formal 
procedure offers a degree of protection against creditors.  
     In Figure 6 the total number of liquidation bankruptcies and the 
number of formal compositions (ackord) for Sweden are shown for the 
period 1985-1996. The average liquidation rate
20 for Sweden for the 
period 1985 to 1996 is 99.2 percent. It is clear that formal composition 
does not offer a strong alternative to informal work-out. If an informal 
work-out cannot be negotiated, the alternative is liquidation bankruptcy, 
where in the company can be sold in parts or as “going concern”.  
Figure 6 here 
         In Figure 7, we see the corresponding figures for Germany.
21 The 
data indicates the same situation for Germany as for Sweden, i.e. the 
formal composition is not a real alternative to the liquidation process. The 
average liquidation rate is 99,7. Obviously, formal restructuring does not 
explain the low frequency of bankruptcies in Germany prior to the change 
in law in 1999. For Finland in Figure 8, the situation is slightly different. 
It seems that formal composition is more of an alternative in Finland than 
in Sweden and Germany (figure 7). As mentioned, Finland adopted a new 
reorganization procedure to the bankruptcy code in 1993.  
Figure 7 here 
Figure 8 here 
 
                                                 
20 The ratio between liquidation bankruptcies and liquidation bankruptcies plus formal compositions 
(reorganizations)  
21 The liquidation process is called Konkursverfahren and the composition process is called 
Vergleichsverfahren. 
  36        For the U.K
22 the liquidation rate is 86 percent. This figure refers to 
the ratio of formal bankruptcies relative to these bankruptcies plus formal 
reorganizations under administration proceedings. Franks and Sussman 
(2000) refer banks’ role in informal work-outs in reorganization and 
liquidation in the UK. They study debt recovery procedures in three 
major commercial banks and find that only about three quarters of the 
number of cases either restructured or liquidated go through formal 
bankruptcy proceedings. If these figures are representative for the UK the 
frequency of informal work-outs plus formal bankruptcies is similar to 
the Swedish bankruptcy frequency. We have also noted that in three 
quarters of the cases of bankruptcy in Sweden the firms continued as 
going concerns.  
       One possible interpretation of the figures for Sweden and the UK is 
that the frequency of informal restructuring of firms, as well as the 
frequency of bankruptcies leading to shut down of firms, is similar. The 
difference would then be that Swedish firms being restructured 
informally are taken through formal bankruptcy proceedings while in the 
UK they are not. If this interpretation is correct, the status of non-priority 
claims is resolved through formal proceedings in Sweden, while in the 
UK the status of these claims is negotiated. This difference could be 
explained by the relative costs and speed of formal bankruptcy 
proceedings. The interpretation is also consistent with the observation 
that both Sweden and the UK have strongly creditor oriented laws relying 
to a substantial extent on contractual arrangements between lenders and 
firms. 
         Figure 9 displays the two main insolvency procedures in the USA; 
Chapter 7 (liquidation under the bankruptcy code) and Chapter 11 
(reorganisation under the bankruptcy code). The USA differs from all 
                                                 
22 Couwenberg (2001). 
  37other countries in our sample. The average liquidation rate in USA is 70,2 
percent. Even if liquidation (chapter 7) is the procedure used most often, 
the reorganisation procedure (chapter 11) is a real alternative. Formal 
restructuring occurs with greater frequency than in the other countries. 
Even so frequency of restructuring plus the frequency of bankruptcy 
appears far lower than in the Scandinavian countries. The latter 
observation can be made for Germany as well, but in this country the 
frequency of formal restructuring is as low as in the Nordic countries.  
Figure 9 here 
        The relatively low frequencies of bankruptcy in the USA and 
Germany are explained by entirely different factors. In the USA the 
access to formal restructuring reduces incentives for informal work-outs, 
and makes avoidance of liquidation bankruptcy possible for a large share 
of distressed firms. Under more creditor oriented law in Germany the 
bankruptcy and formal restructuring frequency may be kept low because    
petitions for bankruptcy can be rejected by the courts, if the assets in the 
bankrupt companies are insufficient to cover the cost of the legal 
proceedings
23. According to Fialski (1994) and White (1996), this is the 
case for some 75 percent of petitions in bankruptcy. For the period we 
investigate  an average of 73 percent of the petitions were rejected by the 
court. This means that in Germany that liquidation procedures generally 
occurs outside of the bankruptcy procedure
24. In addition, filing for 
bankruptcy in Germany is expensive
25. Adjusting the frequency of 
bankruptcy in Germany for the high rejection rate by the courts, the total 
                                                 
23 Fialski (994). 
24 White (1996). According to the professor Friedrich Kuebler, “Whenever the costs for the bankrupcy 
proceedings exceed the assetsof the debtor, there will be no bankrupcy; this is now sec. 26 of the 
Insolvency Code. I think the rationale makes sense: nobody is served, when the remaining assets are 
absorbed by the costs. These costs would have priority with regard to creditors. If there is no 
bankrupcy, creditors can go ahead with individual enforcement measures. But in most cases they will 
not be able to trace any assets worth the enforcement costs and efforts.Thus the court decision based on 
sec. 26 ias normally the end of the story. 
25 White (1996). 
  38liquidation frequency reaches an order of magnitude similar to those in 
Sweden, Finland and Norway. 
          Looking at the changes in the ratio between liquidation 
bankruptcies and total formal proceedings we can see that the ratio 
remains almost unaltered over the time period in the USA (see Figure 
10). In Sweden and Germany, on the other hand, the relative frequency of 
liquidation bankruptcies increased during most of the period. The 
tendency was broken to some extent in Finland with the strengthening of 
formal restructuring law in 1993. The average liquidation rate fell from 
100 percent
26 before 1993 to 92,8 percent. This number indicates that 
Finnish law remained relatively creditor oriented. 
.           Sweden adopted a new restructuring law in 1996. The average 
liquidation rate for the period 1997 to 2000 is 99,6 percent and almost 
identical to the 99.7 percent rate for the eight previous years. In Germany 
the restructuring law implemented in 1999 seems to have led to an 
increase in the share of formal restructurings and the total number of 
firms going through formal procedures. The data is not shown since we 
do not have sufficient data to draw firm conclusions. 
Figure 10 here 
         To summarize this section we have argued that the large differences 
between Sweden, Finland, and Norway on the one hand, and the UK and 
Germany on the other, do not indicate large differences, neither in the 
frequency of liquidations, nor in the frequency of informal work-outs. 
Denmark lies in between these groups in terms of bankruptcy frequency. 
We argue that the large differences represent different uses of court 
procedures under relatively creditor-oriented laws. The USA stands out as 
the country with much lower frequency of bankruptcies, higher frequency 
of formal restructuring, and much lower frequency for the total of the two 
                                                 
26 Couwenberg (2001). 
  39categories. The most important characteristic of US law is the relatively 
easy access to formal restructuring under Chapter 11. As a result of this 
access we expect informal work-outs to occur with relatively low 
frequency in the USA. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Economists have long implicitly assumed that institutions need not be 
considered in economic analyses, because they are either invariant or they 
adjust to make market transactions costs negligable. This view has 
changed during recent decades. North (1993) and Olson (1990) have 
pioneered studies of the role of conventions, law, and political institutions 
in economic development. Institutions have substantial inertia but there is 
little doubt that legislation in specific areas can influence economic 
activity a great deal. In a country with a well-developed legal system with 
strong enforcement it is likely that a change in bankruptcy law can affect 
the insolvency process and thereby the process of structural change. 
Another matter is that the political process in most countries creates 
legislative inertia in the sense that vested interests tend to have a strong 
ability to prevent changes in law that affect relative power positions.  
       In the area of bankruptcy law, attempts to strengthen debtors’ 
position in Sweden and other countries during the 90s by means of 
stronger legal procedures for restructuring have had very little effect on 
bankruptcy procedures judging from the data for actual bankruptcies 
ending in liquidation and formal restructurings. The main reason for this 
lack of ineffectiveness of formal restructuring law seems to be that access 
to the formal restructuring procedures have remained restrictive even 
though the procedures may be debtor friendly when initiated. 
      The most important insight of the comparison of bankruptcy and 
restructuring laws in a number of countries is that the existence of 
  40accessible, formal procedures for restructuring does not seem to 
contribute to more effective restructuring of firms. As a matter of fact, the 
opposite argument can be made. One reason is that informal work-outs 
are discouraged when formal procedures for restructuring exists. Another 
reason is that liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings often turn out to be a 
procedure for change of ownership of “going concerns”. A third reason is 
that the statutory approach to restructuring implied by a formal procedure 
implies an abrogation of contractual terms between a firm and its various 
creditors. 
       Effective restructuring in the absence of formal restructuring law 
requires that bankruptcies are handled with reasonable speed and 
predictability in courts, and that law enables firms to use assets as 
security on loan contracts to create an order of priority among creditors 
with the contractual consent of secured and unsecured creditors. Such 
contractual arrangements are possible if a variety of enforceable security 
contracts are made possible by the law.  
        In this light one can question the wisdom of recent changes in 
Swedish bankruptcy law that reduces the scope of so-called floating 
charges as security. There are similar tendencies in other countries to 
reduce the scope for ex ante contracting and informal work-outs by 
strengthening of formal restructuring laws. This strengthening of 
restructuring laws is inspired by the so called Chapter 11 in the USA 
which enables management in distressed firms to seek protection against 
creditors. The strengthening of debtors’ position in distress has also been 
motivated by employment considerations. In our view, these tendencies 
are often based on the misperception that liquidations in bankruptcy 
necessarily leads the closing down of firms and the laying off of 
employees. In fact, enforceable creditor oriented bankruptcy law 
constitutes a powerful incentive for informal work-outs.  
  41         There are dangers as well with powerful creditors. If a creditor has a 
strong monopoly position in the loan market for small firms, it can use its 
position to achieve objectives that not necessarily enhance economic 
efficiency. Furthermore, if there are only a few large creditors, market 
dynamics does not necessarily induce creditors to adopt efficient 
procedures for informal work-outs. 
                  During recent years interesting proposals have been developed 
to deal with the costs involved in bargaining solutions to restructuring. 
Bebchuk (1990 and 1998) has proposed a “market-based” solution to 
resolve the valuation problem inherent in restructurings. Stake-holders 
are given “reorganization rights” and call options on the value of the firm 
providing the right to buy the “reorganization rights”. The strike prices of 
options given to different creditors depend on their priority. The 
underlying principle of the scheme is that no creditor should be made 
worse off with the option than with the original claim. Thus it is 
consistent with insolvency law specifying priority or ex ante contracted 
priority. Further research refining the original proposal has been 
conducted, for example by Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992). 
        In an international comparison Sweden has a relatively high 
bankruptcy frequency. Almost two thirds of these bankruptcies are for 
firms with zero employees. We concluded that tax avoiding bankruptcies 
of so-called shell companies explain a fraction of these bankruptcies but 
not a large enough fraction to explain differences in bankruptcy 
frequencies relative to other countries. Another observation was that 
formal restructurings constituted a very small fraction of bankruptcies in 
Sweden, as well as in Germany, in comparison with Finland, the UK and 
the USA. We argued that the large differences in the frequency of formal 
bankruptcies plus restructurings between Sweden, Finland, and Norway 
on the one hand, and the UK and Germany on the other, do not indicate 
  42large differences the frequency of liquidations, nor in the frequency of 
informal plus formal work-outs. Instead, the differences represent 
different uses of court procedures under relatively creditor-oriented laws. 
The USA stands out as the country with much lower frequency of 
bankruptcies, higher frequency of formal restructuring, and much lower 
frequency for the total of the two categories. 
       If our interpretation of the data is correct, the risk of losing potential 
winners as a result of inefficient insolvency procedures would be greater 
in the USA than in Sweden and other countries with strongly creditor 
oriented laws. The loss of potential winners would be caused primarily by 
excessive survival of “losers”. This survival implies that resources are not 
made available to new potentially winning ventures.  
       One consideration that has been neglected is the size distribution of 
insolvent firms. The vast majority of firms in the bankruptcy data are 
small while most assets are tied up in large firms. It is well known that 
there are very few large bankruptcies in Sweden and many other 
countries. Many firms are simply “ to big to fail” and kept outside the 
bankruptcy mechanism by means of various forms of artificial aid. In the 
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  47Table 1. Types of distress and efficient action at the time of distress (ex 
post efficiency) 
 
                 Definition                                               Action 
The net present value of  assets is 
negative under any management 
team 
 Piecemeal liquidation of assets  Economic distress 
  
The net present value of assets is 
positive under a different 
management team  
Sale of assets as a “going concern” 
to enable a change of management  
The present value of cash flows is 
positive but it is lower than the 
value of claims by non- 
shareholders  
Debt reduction in combination with 
restructuring and/or ownership 
change, if value of assets thereby 
can be enhanced 
Financial distress  




Table 2: Creditor/Debtor Orientation of Corporate Insolvency Law 
Based on Wood (1995) 
Scale: 1= Most pro-creditor  
         10= Most pro-debtor 
 
1.  Former British colonies except S. Africa and Zimbabwe 
2. England,  Australia,  Ireland 
3.  Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland 
4.  Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway 
5.  United States, Canada except Quebec 
6.  Austria, Denmark, Czech and Slovak Republics: S. Africa, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe (all three Dutch-based); 
7. Italy 
8.  Greece, Portugal, Spain, most Latin American countries** 
9.  Former French colonies, Egypt, Belgium and Zaire 
10. France  
 
 No insolvency law: Liberia (many Arab countries) 
Not classified: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Khazakstan 
 
 
*Orientation by explicit law disregarding implementation through the court 
system 





  48Table 3. Determinants of high degree of credit orientation  
Wood (1995) 
 
1.  Wide scope and efficiency on bankruptcy of security and title financing 
(retention of title, factoring, leasing) 
2. Weak  corporate  rehabilitation statutes  
3.  Insolvency set-off enables reciprocal unsecured creditor to be paid 
ahead of other unsecured creditors 
4.  *Ownership of assets in the possession of debtor is recognized (e.g. 
trusts) 
5.  *veil of incorporation and protection of directors against personal 
liability 
 
*These determinants are ambiguous from creditors point of view, but 
creditor-orientation by these determinants can be seen as the recognition of 
explicit and implicit contracts between the firm and various stakeholders. 






















  49Table 4. Characteristics of restructuring law in selected countries 
Constructed based primarily on Wood (1995) 
 UK  France  Japan  USA  Germany  Spain 
Easy entry based on 
restrictions on remaining 
assets  
no yes  no  yes  no  no 





     director  liability 
for failure to 
initiate 
proceedings 
Freeze on executions and 
liquidation proceedings 
yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Stay on enforcement, use 
of secured assets 
stay but 
blocking power 
of holder of 













limited stay  stay on 
enforcement 




as above  as above  as above  as above  as above 
Impact on recissions 
(counterparties’ right not 
to deliver to insolvent 
firm) 
no yes  yes  yes  no  yes,  after 
employees, state
Disclaimer and 
abandonment powers by 
administrators 




yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Replacement of 
mgmt/power of 




yes court  yes 
receiver 
no    up to "interven-
tores" 



























  80% of debts 
Summary evaluation* 












      strong 
•  Weak=protective freeze on creditor action but no fundamental distortion of creditor rights. 
Strong= significant erosion of creditor rights with preservation of debtor’s 
estate and possibility of survival   
 
  50Table 5. Average number of company-liquidation-bankruptcies for the 










Std  Skewness kurtosis 
Sweden 12  11  256
** 5  575  0,601  -1,046 
Norway 12  2  720
** 1  050  0,01  -0,95 
Finland 11  4  346
** 1  762  0,480  -1,272 
Denmark 12  2  395
** 650  -0,147  -0,907 
USA 12 37  634
** 6  300  0,454  0,062 
Germany 12  14  053
** 5  476  1,093  0,288 
Great Britain  12  16 249
** 4  698  0,679  -0,279 
For the mean values, it is a two-sided t-test.
 
*Significant at a 5 % significant level 
**Significant at a 1 % significant level 
 
Table 6. Average number of company-liquidation-bankruptcies in relation to 












Std Test  statistic 
Sweden 12  0,0030
** 0,0016 
 
Norway 12  0,0015
** 0,0006  F-value 
Finland 11  0,0023
** 0,0011  20,46
* 
Denmark 12  0,0010
** 0,0003   
USA 12  0,0008
** 0,0002  X
2-value 
Germany 12  0,0004
** 0,0001  67,7
** 
Great Britain  12  0,0005
** 0,0002   
The F-value is for a one-sided ANOVA test of equal means. 
X
2-value is for a Kruskall-Wallis test of equal medians 
*Significant at a 5 % significant level 
**Significant at a 1 % significant level 
 
Table 7. A summary of Tamhane’s test for a  
pairwise comparison of the different countries’ frequency of  
bankruptcy for the period 1985 – 1996. 
  Significance level 
The country that  has a 
significantly larger 
average frequency of 
bankruptcy 
0,01 0,05 
Sweden > Great  Britain Denmark 
 USA  
 Germany  
Norway >  USA Great  Britain 
 Germany   
Finland >  USA Denmark 
 Germany  Great  Britain 
Denmark >  USA  
 Germany   
Great Britain > USA   
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Table 8. On average share of company-liquidation-bankruptcies with zero 
employees in relation to total number company-liquidation-bankruptcies for the 










zero employees in 




Std  Skewness Kurtosis 
Sweden 12  0,65
** 0,04  0,102  -1,357 
Norway 10  0,87
** 0,05  -0,346  -0,840 
Finland 8  0,57
** 0,06  0,979  -0,652 
For the mean values, it is a two-sided t-test.
 
*Significant at a 5 % significant level. 




Table 9. A summary of Tamhane’s test for a  
pairwise comparison between the countries Sweden’s, Norway’s and Finland’s  
share of company-liquidation-bankruptcies with zero employees for the period 
1985 – 1996. 
  Level of significance 
The country that has a 
significant larger share 
of bankruptcies with 
zero employees 
0,01 0,05 
Sweden >   Finland 
   
Norway > Sweden   
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Figure 1. Total number of company-liquidation -bankruptcies for the respective 
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Figure 2. Total number of liquidation bankruptcies in relation to total number of 










































Figure 3. Total number of company-liquidation-bankruptcies in relation to total 

























Figure 4. Number of company-liquidation-bankruptcies with zero employees for 











































































Figur 5. The relationship between company-liquidation-bankruptcies with zero 
employees  to total number of company-liquidation for Sweden, Norway and 
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Figure 6. Total number of liquidation bankruptcies and formal composition for 
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Figure 7. Total number of liquidation bankruptcies and formal compositions in 
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Figure 10. Number of formal company-liquidation-bankruptcies per formal 
composition/reorganization in Sweden, Germany, Finland and ÚSA during the 
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